High-res Losing the support of Afghanistan’s people was more destructive to the war than losing any firefight to the Taliban. But McChrystal didn’t sufficiently sell his decisions to his own troops, explaining to them why they were ultimately in their interests. “I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts,” a Special Forces veteran told Michael Hastings for his fateful McChrystal profile in Rolling Stone. “His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger.” There was something else missing from McChrystal’s network: the U.S. embassy in Kabul. While McChrystal and Amb. Karl Eikenberry, a former Afghanistan war commander himself, supposedly enjoyed good relations, the embassy and NATO sometimes seemed like they weren’t in the same country. Then one of Eikenberry’s cables back to Washington casting doubt on McChrystal’s desired troop surge leaked to the press. That poisoned the well. “Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books,” McChrystal kvetched to Hastings. “Now if we fail, they can say, ‘I told you so.’” But the surge itself was causing a breach with the most important node in McChrystal’s network: the White House. In the 2009 debates over sending more troops to Afghanistan, President Obama reportedly felt like the military was boxing him into an unwise escalation. McChrystal, in London for one of his first public appearances, bluntly remarked that he thought all other strategies were doomed. Although McChrystal repeatedly defended the Obama team, the press went wild with a narrative about an insubordinate commander, and not without some justification. Obama ultimately endorsed the surge, but it was, at best, a Pyrrhic victory for McChrystal.  (via How Special Ops Copied al-Qaida to Kill It | Danger Room | Wired.com)

Losing the support of Afghanistan’s people was more destructive to the war than losing any firefight to the Taliban. But McChrystal didn’t sufficiently sell his decisions to his own troops, explaining to them why they were ultimately in their interests. “I would love to kick McChrystal in the nuts,” a Special Forces veteran told Michael Hastings for his fateful McChrystal profile in Rolling Stone. “His rules of engagement put soldiers’ lives in even greater danger.”

There was something else missing from McChrystal’s network: the U.S. embassy in Kabul. While McChrystal and Amb. Karl Eikenberry, a former Afghanistan war commander himself, supposedly enjoyed good relations, the embassy and NATO sometimes seemed like they weren’t in the same country. Then one of Eikenberry’s cables back to Washington casting doubt on McChrystal’s desired troop surge leaked to the press. That poisoned the well. “Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books,” McChrystal kvetched to Hastings. “Now if we fail, they can say, ‘I told you so.’”

But the surge itself was causing a breach with the most important node in McChrystal’s network: the White House. In the 2009 debates over sending more troops to Afghanistan, President Obama reportedly felt like the military was boxing him into an unwise escalation. McChrystal, in London for one of his first public appearances, bluntly remarked that he thought all other strategies were doomed. Although McChrystal repeatedly defended the Obama team, the press went wild with a narrative about an insubordinate commander, and not without some justification. Obama ultimately endorsed the surge, but it was, at best, a Pyrrhic victory for McChrystal.

 (via How Special Ops Copied al-Qaida to Kill It | Danger Room | Wired.com)

  • Wired

Recent comments

Blog comments powered by Disqus

Notes

  1. anindiscriminatecollection reblogged this from brooklynmutt
  2. youenchantedme reblogged this from bubbl3tea
  3. ayoeileen20 reblogged this from alecksg
  4. orangejuiceahoymotherfucker reblogged this from bubbl3tea
  5. mrprimetime reblogged this from relaaaaaax
  6. bubbl3tea reblogged this from brooklynmutt
  7. hugglesworth reblogged this from brooklynmutt
  8. brooklynmutt posted this